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Public Power and Private Purpose: Odious Debt and
the Political Economy of Hegemony
Louis A. Pirez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman t
I spent thirty-three years and four months in active military
service as a member of this country's most agile military force,
the Marine Corps. I served in all commissioned ranks from
Second Lieutenant to Major-General. And during that period, I
spent most of my time being a high class muscle-man for Big
Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short, I was a
racketeer, a gangster for capitalism.
I suspected I was just part of a racket at the time. Now I am
sure of it. Like all the members of the military profession, I
never had a thought of my own until I left the service. My
mental faculties remained in suspended animation while I
obeyed the orders of higher-ups. This is typical with everyone in
the military service.
I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American
oil interests in 1914. 1 helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent
place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I
helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics
for the benefits of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is
long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking
house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912 (where have I heard that
name before?). I brought light to the Dominican Republic for
American sugar interests in 1916. In China I helped to see to it
that Standard Oil went its way unmolested.
-Major General Smedley Butler (1933)'
t Louis A. Pdrez, Jr.: J. Carlyle Sitterson Professor of History, University of
North Carolina Deborah M. Weissman: Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
School of Law. The authors would like to thank Maxine Eichner, Adam Feibelman, and
Mitu Gulati for thoughtful suggestions and informative conversations. Also, the authors
thank Marty Rosenbluth for his research assistance.
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The large money center banks are the true foreign aid
policymakers of the United States.
-Representative Jim Leach, R- Iowa.2
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I. Introduction
The purpose of this article is to rethink the Odious Debt
discourse by drawing attention to the relationship between finance
capital in service of national interests and as an instrument of U.S.
foreign policy. The current debates have attempted to arrive at a
2 Jeff Gerth, Pressure on Bank Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1982, at D3
(quoting U.S. Representative Jim Leach, (R-Iowa)).
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usable definition of Odious Debt. In historical terms, Odious Debt
has referred to sovereign indebtedness that may be repudiated
under circumstances that imply a debt incurred by a despotic ruler
with the full knowledge of the lender that the transaction was
without the consent of or the benefit for the citizenry.3
The comments that follow are driven by the argument that the
United States has used bank loans in the world system as a
dominant facet of imperialism. Attention to this issue necessarily
deepens the complexity in arriving at any workable legal theory to
address the issue of Odious Debt.
The concerns addressed on the pages that follow explore the
inter-relationship between the use of finance capital and national
interests. We use historical narratives not as means to document
the origins of the Odious Debt doctrine as has been commonly
done, but rather to demonstrate the complexity attending efforts to
create an Odious Debt doctrine that might function in law.4 That
the practice of loans-both private and public-and the protocols of
repayment have experienced dramatic changes in recent decades
does not alter the historic character, and function, of loans in aid of
national and foreign policy interests. Simply stated, issues that we
confront in our times are themselves a product of the structural
and historical convergence of private economic power and
political strategies.
This article is predicated on the understanding that attention to
Odious Debt is distinguished from other sovereign debt issues by
concern for the ways that the use and/or misuse of foreign capital
enables human rights violations. Scholars writing about Odious
Debt invoke such concerns by calling for the development of
mechanisms that will "cut off malignant regimes' access to
weapons or other goods."5 Commentators who address the burden
of repayment of debts originally incurred for the purpose of
repression have characterized the need to create an Odious Debt
doctrine as a "moral imperative" to avoid "morally repugnant
3 Lee Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 15-16, on file with authors).
4 See infra Part II.
5 Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debt or Odious Regimes? 70 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming May 2007) (manuscript at 1, on file with authors).
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6
consequences" attending the enforcement of repayment. Indeed,
human rights organizations have encouraged the development of
an Odious Debt doctrine.7 The orderly and regular payment of
debts is, of course, a matter of concern in these discussions. What
appears to be the determining factor distinguishing Odious Debt
from other sovereign debt restructuring issues is, hence, not
simply the proposals for their resolution. Rather, it is the notion
that a mechanism, whether ex ante or ex poste, must be created to
avoid loans from becoming instruments of repression and harm.
There has been renewed interest in the doctrine of Odious Debt
since the war in Iraq. Shortly after the invasion, the United States
campaigned for the reduction of Iraq's debt, a significant portion
of which could be considered odious.8  Presumably, the
elimination of Iraq's debt would enhance Iraqi resources for the
benefit of U.S. interests. 9 Given the primary purpose of the
revitalization of the Odious Debt doctrine, this article suggests that
the relationships between finance capital and national interests
must be factored in as an element of Odious Debt. The
circumstances of the loan, the use of funds by the sovereign debtor
state, the nature of the regime, state succession, and, finally, the
structures and processes to determine whether such debts should
6 Buchheit et al., supra note 3, at 22-24.
7 Probe International, Odious Debts, http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/
index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2007); Jubilee Iraq, http://www.jubileeiraq.org/blog/
(last visited Apr. 11, 2007); Campaign for the Cancellation of Haiti's Debt,
http://www.haitisupport.gn.apc.org/fea-camps-main.html#de (last visited Apr. 11,
2007).
8 Testimony of John B. Taylor, Under-Sec'y of the Treasury for Int'l Affairs
before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, (May 20, 2004),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/jsl669.htm.
9 Iraqi Debt: Double Speak (Sept., 2004) (Int'l Cooperation for Dev. & Solidarity
unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.cidse.org/
docs/200409271712468293.pdf (observing that U.S. economic interests wanted to avoid
encumbering their investments with prior debt burdens: "[f ]or the US, letting the debt
contracted by Saddam Hussein burden Iraq's budget and mortgage future oil revenue is
out of the question"). ESTHER PAN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IRAQ: THE
REGIME'S DEBT (2003), http://www.cfr.org/publication/7796/ (characterizing forgiveness
of Iraqi foreign debt as a "real boom waiting to happen"). Tai-Heng Cheng,
Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
May, 2007) (noting that U.S. corporations would benefit by debt repudiation which
would assure that Iraqi revenues would be available to them as opposed to pre-existing
debts).
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be repudiated or repaid are all factors which should be considered.
This article suggests that the convergence of creditor banking
interests with political concerns often contributes to the harmful
circumstances sought to be remedied by the doctrine of Odious
Debt.
Our paper examines Odious Debt as a matter of banking
and U.S. foreign policy. Part II examines the convergence of
private and government interests that serve to influence the
conditions and purposes of sovereign loans.1" Part II also
examines historical narratives as a way to set in relief the complex
relations relevant to the creation of Odious Debts. It suggests that
the unity of interests between financial elites and U.S. political
actors may create the very concerns at issue in the Odious Debt
discourse. Part III reviews the manner in which laws, regulations,
legal policy, and legal doctrine have been shaped by the
convergence of market and policy interests in ways that further
complicate the rationales for legal approaches to Odious Debts."
It examines the suitability of private law functioning "as a
coherent set of rules for the centralized adjudication of contracts,
torts, and property disputes" as a legal framework for Odious
Debt. 12 It also reviews existing case law regarding sovereign debt,
specifically the Allied Bank-Costa Rica trilogy, with regard to the
court's deference to U.S. interests that prevail over other legal
considerations in litigating these issues. In the realm of law, the
combination of factors that affect laws and legal policy
demonstrates the complexity, if not impossibility, of developing a
workable legal theory to address Odious Debt. In Part IV, we
conclude by suggesting that the templates for resolving Odious
Debt must be structured in a manner that transcends the power
inherent in developing nations debtor-first world creditor
relationships. 3
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part III.
12 Daniela Caruso, Private Law And State-Making In The Age Of Globalization, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 5 (2006).
13 See infra Part IV.
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II. Interlocking Interests: Private Loans to Sovereign States
and Foreign Policy
Banking and financial investments, trade and commerce,
manufacturing and industry, matters of supply and demand, among
other facets of the free enterprise system, do not function in a
vacuum. They operate in a real-world context; they act upon-
and in turn are acted upon-by a host of factors that often determine
survival, many of which have little relationship to market
mechanisms. Matters related to public policy and government
regulation, graft, corruption, malfeasance, national interests, and
foreign policy, among others factors, are conditions that have
decisive effects on the workings of market mechanisms.
4
Nowhere perhaps do these forces operate with greater effect than
in the realm of banking and finance, especially as they relate to
international credit transactions.
A. The Convergence of Private Interests and Government
Interests.
In designing a legal framework for analyzing Odious Debt,
scholars are obliged to acknowledge the realpolitik of global
power relationships as the context within which loans to sovereign
states are made. Banks are subject to the constraints of policy
imperatives and the national interests of the states in which they
operate. In fact, the relationship is dialectical. Bankers wield
private economic power and political influence over policymakers
with whom they share larger ideological assumptions. Indeed,
often policy makers and bankers are the same people, frequently
moving between public office and private boardrooms.' 5 Hence,
not infrequently, the lines of interests intersect and converge.
These circumstances raise questions about whether these debts are
"pure" financial transactions or political intervention in the affairs
14 See Albert H. Choi & Eric Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine 1-2
(Univ. of Va. Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 58, 2007) (noting the
various and complex reasons that support relationships, including trade, with dictatorial
regimes) available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 098&context
=uvalwps.
15 See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
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of other states by other means on behalf of U.S. economic and
strategic interests. 6 To begin to consider these questions, it is
helpful to examine relationships between bankers and government.
1. Bankers and Government
A historical perspective on the relationships between bankers
and government offers a useful way to review these relationships
and appreciate the ways in which the interaction between private
and public actors has influenced economic decisions and political
outcomes. The movement of elite actors between the private
realm of banking and the public sphere of government is an
established facet of American history. Social registries, family
genealogies, newspaper society pages, memoirs, business records,
and government reports document the social, economic, and
political connections between bankers and public officials. 7
These relationships have been forged at elite universities, and in
private clubs, cemented through professional ties, and replicated in
marriages and family affiliations. 8
There exists a vast amount of literature on the topic of
influential banking families including regional, national, and
international elites.' 9 The history of J. P. Morgan is emblematic of
16 See EMILY ROSENBERG, FINANCIAL MISSIONARIES TO THE WORLD: THE POLITICS
AND CULTURE OF DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, 1900-1930, at 60 (1999) (describing the control
of finances and debt repayment by the United States in the Dominican Republic as "an
alternative to colonialism that would still institute the supervision . . . deemed necessary
for fiscal and social reform"). Id.
17 Godfrey Hodgson, The Foreign Policy Establishment, in RULING AMERICA, A
HISTORY OF WEALTH AND POWER IN A DEMOCRACY 215, 220 (Steve Fraser & Gary
Gerstle, eds., 2005) (describing establishment elites connected through class, culture, and
dynasty).
18 See generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, WALL STREET, BANKS, AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1995), available at http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/
rothbard66.html (providing a detailed account of the span of these relationships
developed primarily through family and marriages ties, personal friendships, and close
business partners).
19 See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN DYNASTY, ARISTOCRACY, FORTUNE, AND
THE POLITICS OF DECEIT IN THE HOUSE OF BUSH (2004); CYRUS VEESER, A WORLD SAFE
FOR CAPITALISM: DOLLAR DIPLOMACY AND AMERICA'S RISE To GLOBAL POWER 5, 16-19
(2002) (detailing the connections between the N.Y.-based investment company that
controlled finances in the Dominican Republic with U.S. presidents, cabinet members,
and diplomats). For other scholarly works on these relationships, see generally, RON
CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN (2001); JEAN STROUS, MORGAN: AMERICAN
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these overlapping relationships and demonstrates the influence of
banks on foreign policy and the reciprocal sway of government
interests in market matters.2z The personnel exchanges that have
taken place at the highest echelons of policy-making and market
transactions have been detailed in a number of accounts.2'
Morgan's interests were not the only financial power brokers to
play this role. The history of the Rockefeller family, among
others, for example, features nearly as prominently in the realm of
influential moneyed elite who moved continuously between the
private and the public spheres of power.22 But it is Morgan's close
and constant personal connections with public officials and the
role of Morgan's associates in government that establishes the
Morgan family as emblematic of those banking interests that have
ready access to political power.
The administration of Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) is
illustrative of the convergence of finance, commerce, and public
policy. 23 Roosevelt's Secretaries of State John Hay, Elihu Root,
and Robert Bacon all had close ties with banking interests,
including Morgan. 4 Secretary of Navy Paul Morton served
FINANCIER (2000); Kenneth Hafertepe, Banking Houses in the United States: The First
Generation, 35 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 1781 (2000); CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL
STREET: A HISTORY (1997); KATHLEEN BARK, MORGAN GRENFELL, 1838-1988: THE
BIOGRAPHY OF A MERCHANT BANK (1990).
20 ROTHBARD, supra note 18, at 3 (demonstrating the influence of the Morgan
family on administrations from the mid 1800s through the beginning of the 20th
century).
21 Karen S. Hoffman, "Going Public" in the Nineteenth Century: Grover
Cleveland's Repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 5 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 57, 62
n.21 (2002) (noting that Morgan served as financial advisor to Grover Cleveland);
Richard H. Wiebe, The House of Morgan and the Executive, 1905-1913, 65 AM. HIST.
REV. 49, 51 (1959) (describing the close and controlling relations between J.P. Morgan
and Senator Nelson W. Aldrich).
22 See generally PETER COLLIER & DAVID HOROWITz, THE ROCKEFELLER: AN
AMERICAN DYNASTY (1976); See also ROTHBARD, supra note 18, at 21-22 (describing the
influence of Morgans and Rockefeller with regard to the establishment of the federal
reserve system).
23 See Joseph G. Haubrich & Jodo A. C. Santos, Alternative Forms of Mixing
Banking with Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INST. &
INSTRUMENTS 121 (2003) (providing an overview of the convergence of banking and
commerce).
24 Bacon was a member of J.P. Morgan & Company from 1894-1903. Hall of the
Secretaries of State, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/secretaries/rbacon.htm (last visited
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previously as vice-president of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad in which Morgan had a substantial interest.25 Assistant
Secretary of Navy Herbert L. Satterlee was married to Morgan's
eldest daughter and had served as Morgan's business associate and
advisor. 26 This combination of interests shaped a foreign policy in
which the lines between national interests and private concerns
were always blurred and increasingly merged. Nowhere did these
issues reveal themselves with greater clarity than in Latin
America.
Historian Gabriel Kolko borrows Max Weber's term "political
capitalism" to describe this era as a time when financiers and
government officials mixed politics and law "to secure those
conditions of stability and predictability so vital to a rationalized
capitalist economy. ' 27  Financial loan transactions were the
primary means for securing U.S. financial and political leverage
throughout Latin America. 28  External debts may have been
transacted by private banks but the terms of these "controlled"
loans were negotiated with the participation of government
officials who obtained concessions in the form of control over the
Apr. 11, 2007). See John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Five Who Made Empire, 79 VA. Q.
REV. 578, 581 (2003) (noting that Root gained a reputation as counsel for J.P. Morgan).
25 See History of the Randsburg Railway, http://www.randsburg-
railway.com/history.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2007); Carlos D. Ramirez, Did J. P.
Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment, Cash Flow, and Financial
Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 50 J. OF FIN. 661, 667 (1995) (noting the
affiliation and control of the railroad company by Morgan); ROTHBARD, supra note 18, at
11-12 (noting the relationship between Morton and the Morgan-controlled Atchison,
Topeka, and Santa Fe).
26 ROTHBARD, supra note 18 at 12
27 GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 179 (1963). Using letters and correspondence
between business and government, Kolko documents the ways in which antitrust
legislation reflected the interests of big business, which recognized a need for order and
control. Id. at 167. See Wiebe, supra note 21, at 51 (noting that Roosevelt's antitrust
initiatives were no bane to Wall Street, whose influential members financed his
candidacy for a second term as President); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs
Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms
and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1613 (2004).
28 ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 65 (describing Morgan and other banking interests
as focusing on Latin America). See Alberto Gonzalo Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady:
Deeper Debt Reduction for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 67
(1991) (describing the sizeable debt owed by Latin American countries to private banks).
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borrowing state's economy. 29 Debtor states were often obliged to
modify elements of public administration and political institutions.
They had to agree to transform their economies and accept the
advice and direction of financial experts whose judgments would
take precedence over the sovereign debtor state and whose power
and influence served to interfere with groups who opposed U.S.
foreign control.3 ° Loan transactions thus served as more than
"private financial transactions, but as one of the instruments
through which national destiny was achieved., 31  Credit was a
means of political control, often to the detriment of the internal
interests of other countries, and often producing the very harm
associated with Odious Debt.
2. The Business of Diplomacy, the Diplomacy of
Business, and Loans and Hemispheric Hegemony
It was this convergence of interests that also shaped a foreign
policy characterized by intervention and interference throughout
Latin America, a policy that exemplifies Max Weber's use of the
term "political capitalism," an imperial capitalism that uses the
force of one state to seize profits from another.32 In this period,
armed intervention and military occupation throughout the
Caribbean and Pacific were a dominant means of expanding
American influence. Financial transactions between banks and
29 ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 62. Rosenberg also describes how sovereignty of
borrowing states was further impaired by the importation of economic experts who
advised debtor governments about how to transform their economies in ways that
benefited the United States. Id. at 195-96.
30 Id. at 92-93, 105 (noting that financial supervision of sovereign debtors by U.S.
professional managers was at times buttressed by military control, although such
supervision was designed to substitute for out and out colonialism).
31 Id. at 52 (describing the view of European lenders whose views were emulated in
the United States).
32 The U.S. military seized territories and sponsored regime changes in the 1890's
(Spanish American War, Brazil, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Panama), making way
for Morgan family banking interests to profit through purchase and control of the
Panama Canal Company. Kris James Mitchener & Marc Weidenmier, Empire, Public
Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary, 65 J. OF ECON. HIST. 658, 676 (2005); MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 917 (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich eds. 1968); Peter Breiner,
'Unnatural Selection': Max Weber's Concept of Auslese and His Criticism of the
Reduction of Political Conflict to Economics, 18 INT'L REL. 289, 304 (2004).
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states featured prominently in these efforts.33
This convergence of interests assumed full policy form in 1904
with the pronouncement of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine. The pronouncement outlined the imperative by which
the United States assumed the role of regional arbitrator of the
legitimacy of governments to be measured by payment of debts
and obligations.34 Roosevelt's pronouncement was preceded by
the actions of European powers who had earlier intervened
militarily to force the issue of Venezuela's debt repayment and
then sought enforcement of their debt contracts through the Hague
Tribunal. 5 U.S. politicians and bankers were wary of the exercise
of European influence in the hemisphere as well as the
subordination of American debts.36  These circumstances
encroached on U.S. military and political interests in the region
and impaired the interests of U.S. foreign investment bankers as
well. Roosevelt sought to rectify this situation in his diplomatic
pronouncement:
All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries
stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people
conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship.
If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable
efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps
order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from
the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which
results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may
in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by
some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the
adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may
force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of
such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an
international police power.37
33 ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 92-93.
34 The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, H.R. Doc. No. 1-59, at xxxiii-
xxxv (1904), available at http://www.state.gov/r/palho/time/gp/17660.htm.
35 Mitchener & Weidenmier, supra note 32, at 662.
36 Id.
37 The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore
Roosevelt's Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 6, 1904, in THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 1790-1966, at 2134 (Fred L. Israel ed. 1966), available at
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/us-relations/roosevelt-corollary.htm.
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U.S. policies were largely successful. As a result of the Roosevelt
Corollary, sovereign debt prices in Latin America significantly
increased in value.3 ' But Roosevelt's pronouncement did not by
itself comprise the whole of a new policy toward sovereign debt.
The United States increasingly resorted to military and political
intervention to force the repayment of foreign debt.
a. The Santo Domingo Investment Company
The history of the Santo Domingo Investment Company offers
an exemplary case study. The U.S. intervention provides a
compelling illustration of a web of political and economic
concerns for the purpose of reshaping power relations in Latin
America.
In the late nineteenth century, Santo Domingo's foreign debt
was purchased by the San Domingo Improvement Company
(SDIC), a New York-based company with ties to officials in the
U.S. government.' 9 Much of the Santo Domingo foreign debt was
incurred by a profligate and corrupt dictator, Ulises Heureaux (in
and out of power between 1882 and 1899), a long-time ally of the
United States who continued to borrow for nefarious purposes
while working closely with SDIC.40  At the time of the debt
purchase, atrocities committed by Heureaux were known both to
SDIC and to the U.S. government.4 ' These facts were deemed
irrelevant to the SDIC and to U.S. politicians.42 Control over
Dominican finances served each set of interests: the SDIC seeking
to increase its profit, and the U.S. government wishing to increase
38 Mitchener & Weidenmier, supra note 32, at 664-66, 670 (quoting the
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders who attributed rising bond prices to the Corollary:
"the increase in values is largely due to the idea that the recent utterances of President
Roosevelt with regard to the Monroe Doctrine were intended to indicate that the United
States Government would not allow the Spanish-American Republics . . . to evade the
payment of their liabilities to their foreign creditors").
39 VEESER, supra note 19 at 3, 11, 16-19 (noting that SDIC's president, Smith M.
Weed, was a close friend of Grover Cleveland and had close consultation with President
Benjamin Harrison about his intention to usurp control of Dominican finances from the
Europeans).
40 Id. at 3.
41 Id. at 12.
42 Id.
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its dominion in the Western Hemisphere. 43 "From Washington's
point of view, the project of the SDIC was essentially
geopolitical."'
Historian Cyrus Veeser details the financial transactions and
policies of SDIC and Hereaux that resulted in the country's
economic collapse and ultimately, in a civil insurrection.45
Heureaux was overthrown and assassinated, while SDIC "became
a full-fledged pariah, universally reviled by the Dominican
people. 46 Successive governments sought to diminish American
control and influence over internal affairs and to eliminate foreign
financial control, including the SDIC.47 However, as a result of
U.S. pressure and threats, subsequent governments were ultimately
unsuccessful in their efforts to set their own courts of relations
with SDIC and unable to reclaim control of Dominican finances
without American interference.48
Despite arguments in favor of efforts to resolve the debt in the
Hague Court or by bringing the dispute to a special international
commission for arbitration, the United States insisted that the
matter be arbitrated before two Americans and one Dominican.49
The arbitration took place in the United States, notwithstanding
the fact that the Dominican Republic generally adhered to the
Calva Doctrine which disfavored arbitration in the home state of a
foreign investors as a form of meddling in sovereign affairs.5° The
43 Id. at 13, 23 (describing meetings between SDIC operatives and the U.S. Dep't
of State in which the Secretary of State encouraged SDIC's venture in the hopes that
U.S. strategic interests in the area would be improved as Europeans would be divested of
their interests by SDIC's transactions).
44 Id. at 43.
45 VEESER, supra note 19 at 3, 75 (explaining that SDIC management was for the
purpose of making profits from buying and selling Dominican debts; no profits would
yield to the benefit of the state or the lives of its citizens).
46 Id. at 3; Mitchener & Weidenmier, supra note 32, at 681.
47 VEESER, supra note 19, at 99-100.
48 Id. at 100-09.
49 Id. at 110; Richard H. COLLIN, THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S CARIBBEAN: THE
PANAMA CANAL, THE MONROE DOCTRINE, AND THE LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT 402-03
(1992). See CHARLES BEARD & MARY BEARD, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE WORLD WAR 503-36 (MACMILLAN 1921), available
at http://www.marxists.org/archive/beard/history-us/index.htm.
50 Anoosha Boralessa, Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
attorney for SDIC also represented the interests of the United
States.5" Veeser, who examined the arbitration archival records,
described the bias in favor of the SDIC and the United States and
wrote: "while presenting itself as an appeal to a higher standard of
justice, the arbitration in fact resembled the victory of one set of
local interests over another."52
Not surprisingly, the outcome favored SDIC and established
not only that the sovereign debt would have to be repaid, but
awarded to the United States the exercise of power over all matters
of debt repayment and control of Dominican finances.53 The terms
of repayment left the Dominican government in a disastrous
position, unable to pay other foreign debtors.54 Dominicans were
dispossessed of all forms of sovereignty and the resentment and
ill-will toward the United States was a source of such instability as
to have bearing on the decision by the United States to militarily
occupy the country.55
Although the United States eventually abandoned SDIC for
fear that its excesses and "venality" impaired the orderly and
controlled operations of capitalism, it did not abandon its
geopolitical strategy to act in concert with private financial
interests. In the Dominican Republic, as in many other Latin
American states, dollar diplomacy functioned in concert with
gunboat diplomacy and military occupation. U.S. marines waged
ICSID Awards Against the Republic of Argentina: Obstacles That Transnational
Corporations May Face, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 53, 58-59 (2004); Christina L.
Whittinghill, The Role and Regulation of International Commercial Arbitration in
Argentina, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 795, 798 (2003) (explaining that the Calva doctrine
enunciated by an Argentine jurist in 1868, "stated that foreign investors should not be
allowed to resort to their home governments to solve their disputes in Latin America");
D. H. N. Johnson, Review: The Calva Clause. A Problem of Inter-American and
International Law and Diplomacy by Donald R. Shea, 20 MOD. L. REV. 428, 429 (1957);
Cyrus Veeser, Inventing Dollar Diplomacy: The Gilded Age Origins of the Roosevelt
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 27 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 301, 305 (2003).
51 VEESER, supra note 19, at 105, 110 (describing the role of John Bassett Moore,
who served as counsel for SDIC and as the representative of the State Department in
legal proceedings to enforce payment of SDIC's debt).
52 Id. at 118; see also Veeser, supra note 50, at 305 n.14 (citing sources that
connected the arbitrators with men influential with SDIC).
53 Veeser, supra note 50 at 307.
54 VEESER supra note 19 at 123.
55 Veeser, supra note 50, at 311-12.
[Vol. XXXII
2007] ODIOUS DEBT, BANKING, AND FOREIGN POLICY
war against Dominican insurrectionists, torturing guerrilla fighters
and civilians. 6 The centralization of military power by the United
States and the disruption of self-governance are credited as having
created the Rafael Trujillo regime, described as "the most
repressive regime the Dominicans had ever known. 57
The account of Santo Domingo's sovereign debt during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century illuminates the
complicated structural roots of foreign credit transactions. These
structural roots are relevant to the development of criteria for
determining Odious Debt as a "workable legal theory,"58 including
factors of corrupt or suspicious loans,59 odious regime,6 ° interests
of the people, consent of the people, and knowledge of the
creditor.6' Proposals that deal with principles of law to be
applied,62 and which institutions should adjudicate,63 can be tested
by this historical case. The story of SDIC suggests the necessity
of including in this analysis the real world relationships between
banking and foreign policy and the inexorable entanglement of
private financial interests with geopolitical strategic interests.
56 See BRUCE J. CALDER, THE IMPACT OF INTERVENTION: THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
DURING THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF 1916-1924, at 115 (2006).
57 Id.; see also VEESER, supra note 19, at 160 (noting Rafael Trujillo's brutal 31-
year dictatorship was described as a "legacy" of the centralization of power by the U.S.
marines during the occupation).
58 Buchheit et al, supra note 3, at 23.
59 Id. at 39-40.
60 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 5, at 1.
61 Ashfaq Khalfan et al., Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine (Ctr. for Int'l
Sustainable Dev. Law, Working Paper No. COM/RES/ESJ, 2003), available at
http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/debtentire.pdf.
62 Buchheit et al, supra note 3, at 36-55 (discussing the use of the law of agency as
a defense to Odious Debt); Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority and Odious Debt, 85
N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2007) (suggesting that sovereign debtors and creditors
should adopt a contractual approach).
63 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 5, at 3 (proposing that the United Nations Security
Council and the International Monetary Fund should determine characteristics and
resolution of Odious Debt); Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, Odious Debt,
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W8953, 2002), (proposing an
odious debt tribunal) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8953.
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b. Cuba, Gerardo Machado, and Chase Bank
The relationship between policymakers and bankers has its
antecedents early in the twentieth century, to be sure. But SDIC is
not the only instance that sets in relief the matter of Odious Debt
as a function of the relationship between, on the one hand, national
interests and public policy and, on the other, corporate influence
and private gain. In fact, it was not until the post-World War I
years, during which time the United States emerged as the most
powerful creditor nation in the world, that the efficacy of
collaboration between the State Department and banks revealed
itself.64  The State Department and banks entered into
communications, if not negotiations, and developed the basis for
what both parties soon came to appreciate as mutually beneficial
and reciprocally useful relationships. In fact, as early as June
1921, J.P. Morgan pledged that all future loans to foreign
governments would be undertaken with the full knowledge of the
State Department.65
It was in U.S. relations with Latin America that this
collaboration was perfected. U.S. loans to Latin America not only
served to advance North American strategic interests but also
acted to promote U.S. economic expansion so vital for national
well being. "We now have surplus billions to lend and to invest
abroad," proclaimed Walter Parker of Fenner and Beanne (now
Merrill Lynch).66 The U.S. had acquired "the status of world
banker" and, as Parker declared, "[m]ore and more we will need
the raw materials of other countries. More and more we will need
favorable markets in other countries for our manufacturers., 67 The
64 Memorandum from W.W. Cumberland, Office of the Foreign Trade Advisor,
(Sept. 27, 1921) (on file with the National Archives, Washington, DC, File 811.51/2981,
DS/RG 59), (reflecting that this collaboration developed as a strategy whereby both
parties came to understand their mutual interests). W.W. Cumberland of the State
Department Office of Foreign Trade acknowledged that cooperation was necessary so
that "both the government and business can obtain mutual advantages from being
mutually informed regarding their respective operations and policies." Id.
65 Letter from J.P. Morgan to Warren Harding, (Jun. 6, 1921) (on file with the
National Archives, Washington, D.C., File 811.51/2981, DS/RG 59).
66 Walter Parker, The Trade Promise of the New World, in Official Report of the
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Division of Latin American Affairs predicted that loans for Latin
American development, "whether [they] be for materials made in
the United States, or for public works, or improvements in lands or
industries in Latin America will mean an additional bond of
material and mutual interest between North and South America."68
The collaboration between banks and the State Department can
be seen most vividly in the case of Cuba during the 1920s. Cuban
access to U.S. loans, the prerequisite of which was State
Department approval, was one of the principal methods by which
the U.S. government controlled political outcomes in Cuba. The
State Department collaborated closely with J.P. Morgan in
developing the conditions for a loan to the government of Alfredo
Zayas (1921-1935).69 For its part, the J.P. Morgan interests
insisted to the State Department that General Enoch Crowder be
retained as U.S. ambassador to Cuba. Crowder, the bankers
insisted, was a man in whom they all had confidence to supervise
financial transactions.7"
The matter of collaboration between bankers and policymakers
vis-A-vis Cuba and in relation to the issue of Odious Debt perhaps
is most egregious in the case of the administration of Gerardo
Machado (1925-1933). Elected president in 1924, Machado
completed his full four-year term of office, whereupon he retained
power illegally by extra-constitutional means, and eventually by
68 Memorandum from the Division of Latin American Affairs to Sumner Welles,
(Sept. 29, 1921) (on file with the National Archives, Washington, D.C., File
811.51/2981, DS/RG 59).
69 See Letter from Dwight W. Morrow, Partner of J.P. Morgan & Co., to Alfredo
Zayas (Oct. 7, 1921) (on file with the National Archives, Washington, D.C., File
837.51/624, DS/RG 59), Letter from Charles Evan Hughes to J.P. Morgan (Oct. 20,
1921) (on file with the National Archives, Washington, D.C., File 837.51/624, DS/RG
59).
70 Letter from Dwight W. Morrow, Partner of J.P. Morgan & Co., to Charles Evans
Hughes, (Dec. 27, 1922) (on file with Amherst College Archives and Special Collections
under Cuba-Correspondence, 1921-1922, Dwight W. Morrow Papers) (documenting that
that private loans in furtherance of U.S. interests were conditioned on the appointment of
Crowder). "The bankers with whom I have talked," J.P. Morgan partner Dwight
Morrow wrote privately to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, "are satisfied that
Cuba is fundamental[ly] sound, but that her immediate problems are most intricate.
They believe that the service of the loan and the general conduct of Cuban finances
depend to a large extent upon the ability of the American representative, backed by the
Department of State, to guide the Cuban administration to satisfactory performance." Id.
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force and violence. 71 All through the late 1920s and early 1930s,
as opposition to Machado expanded, Cuba plunged into
catastrophic economic conditions.72  Political repression and
economic depression combined to edge the island toward social
upheaval.73 But it was also true that Machado had created
auspicious conditions for U.S. capital. He repressed the
communist party and he crushed labor unions. All in all, Machado
served as the prototype of "Our Man in Havana."
It was thus with deepening misgivings that the State
Department followed developments in Cuba. Machado, U.S.
officials clearly understood with regret, governed Cuba as a
dictator, illegally, and through terror and torture.74 But, he had
also served U.S. interests well. Thus, the goal of the U.S.
government during the late 1920s and early 1930s was to sustain
Machado's power until some satisfactory peaceful solution to the
Cuban crisis presented itself. To further this end, the State
Department used U.S. loans. "The Government cannot afford to
cut down expenditures," warned C.B. Curtis, the U.S. Charge in
Havana to the Secretary of State.75 Curtis stated,
[t]he Government of Cuba is today a dictatorship.., but
his support is none too secure and must be maintained ...
by employment and desired public works given to the
people at large.. .The people must be kept satisfied by a
proper expenditure of money for Government purposes and
the money must be found. 76
And to the point: "[e]conomically, all kinds of expenses must be
reduced but, politically, this is almost impossible. A loan must be
sought at no very distant date and the United States will probably
71 ROBERT WHITNEY, STATE AND REVOLUTION IN CUBA: MASS MOBILIZATION AND
POLITICAL CHANGE, 1920-1940, at 55-80 (2001).
72 CUBAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH PROJECT, A STUDY ON CUBA: THE COLONIAL AND
REPUBLICAN PERIODS, THE SOCIALIST EXPERIMENT, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE,
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, SOCIALISM AND COLLECTIVIZATION 295-96 (1965).
73 Luis E. AGUILAR, CUBA 1933: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION 98-115 (1972).
74 Dispatch from C. B. Curtis to the Secretary of State, (July 8, 1929) (on file with
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have to approve the loan because of political considerations."77
Banks were thus asked to aid a beleaguered regime out of
"political considerations," as a matter of U.S. policy needs.
Indeed, Chase Bank worked closely with the State Department to
support Machado while at the same time imposing conditions
upon him for the purpose of protecting American interests. 8
c. Re-examining the Historical Premise of Odious
Debt
There is one final concern regarding the discussion of Odious
Debt in a historical context. History is a matter of perspective and,
as contested terrain, it accommodates divergent viewpoints and
conflicting interpretation. The Odious Debt discourse takes as a
point of reference the Cuban debt of 1898. Spain, upon ceding
Cuba to the United States, demanded that the U.S. assume
responsibility for debt incurred by Spain, repayment for which was
to be made with Cuban revenues.79 Scholars often characterize the
grounds upon which the U.S. refused to assume the debt as an
illustration of the operation of the doctrine of Odious Debt. 8' A
number of articles that discuss Odious Debt begin with the
premise that the Cuban debt owed to Spain could be repudiated
because loan proceeds were used to suppress Cubans.81 In fact, it
is neither incomprehensible nor unreasonable that the United
States sought to avoid assumption of the Cuban debt. What is at
issue, however, is the reason given by the United States which
must be viewed as an improvised argument raised to the level of
"principle" as the basis to reject the Cuban debt.
The American repudiation of the Cuban debt at the end of the
U.S. war with Spain (1898) is a complex matter, principally
because it is a case very much contingent on the exercise of
power. For the Americans to have suggested that the debt had
77 Id.
78 ROBERT F. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: BUSINESS AND DIPLOMACY,
1917-1960, at 127-28 (1960).
79 Buchheit et al., supra note 3, at 12.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 11, 16. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 5, at 1; Khalfan et al., supra note
61, at 15-16, 18; Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 82, 83 (2006).
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been "imposed upon the people of Cuba without their consent" is
not, of course, entirely without merit. Within the context of the
Spanish Constitution of 1876, however, Cuba was in fact deemed
part of the Spanish nation with the juridical status of an
ultramarine province. 82 It is not likely that any other Spanish
province, Galicia, for example, or Catalonia, would have had the
ability to render "consent" to the decision by the State to incur a
national debt.
Similarly, the U.S. suggestion at the time-and later
propounded by scholars-that the debt had not been "incurred for
the benefit of the Cuban people" is a problematic proposition. The
insurrection in Cuba was an internal challenge to Spanish rule by a
minority of the population, characterized principally by a war
against property and production: that is, the destruction of
agriculture, ranching, mining, commerce, transportation, and
communication." It is certainly a plausible proposition for the
Spanish government to have argued it had incurred a debt
precisely for the "benefit of the Cuban people"; that is, the debt
was incurred in defense of the interests of that vast portion of the
population that was not implicated in the insurrection and toward
whom the State had fundamental legal responsibilities to act to
protect their life and property. Within the framework of the
Spanish Constitution, Cuba represented a secessionist challenge.84
Spain was no more disposed to acquiesce to Cuban secession than
was the United States inclined to accept the secession of the
Confederacy.
Moreover, the settlement between the United States and Spain
at the Treaty of Paris in 1899, must be understood to be the result
of negotiations between two countries vastly unequal in power. In
fact, the United States was determined to reject the Cuban debt.85
82 RAYMOND CARR, SPAIN 1808-1930, at 379-83 (1966). See INEES ROLDN DE
MONTAUD, LA UNION CONSTITUCIONAL Y LA POLiTICA COLONIAL DE ESPAfJA EN CUBA
(1868-1878) 154, 156-57 (1991).
83 See JOHN LAWRENCE TONE, WAR AND GENOCIDE IN CUBA 1895-1898, at 57-68
(2006).
84 See generally RAFAEL PtREz DELGADO, 1898, EL AF4O DEL DESASTRE (1976);
Josit BAR6N FERNANDEZ, LA GUERRA HISPANO-NORTEAMERICANA DE 1898 (1993); JUAN
ESLAVA GALAN & DIEGO ROJANO ORTEGA, LA ESPAJA DEL 98: EL FIN DE UNA ERA
(1997).
85 WALTER, MILLIS, THE MARTIAL SPIRIT 378-80 (1931).
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The defeat of Spain enabled the United States to impose on Spain
a peace settlement on the terms entirely favorable to American
interests. The U.S. repudiation of the Cuban debt has less to do
with the circumstances of the Cuban insurrection (1895-1898) than
with the logic of the victor imposing the terms of peace on the
vanquished. That is, the pronouncement of principles as reason to
reject the debt was an ex post facto morale rationale to explain a
political decision. Considered in this light, the proposition that the
U.S. repudiation of the Cuban debt serves as an example of a state
practice of refusing to repay an odious debt is doubtful.86
One only has to consider the long legacy of merged economic
interests and political concerns that fostered U.S. sponsored
successive regime changes and coups in such countries as
Nicaragua, 87 Guatemala, 88 and Chile, 89 as well as the use of loans
as an instrumentality of Cold War positioning for the West.9" In
86 See Jeff King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 101, 129-30 (2007) (suggesting that the U.S. repudiation of the Cuban debt is
a "relevant instance[] of state practice" that gives rise to a customary international legal
standard that establishes when nations might repudiate odious debts).
87 ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 66-67 (describing U.S. opposition to President
Jos6 Santos Zelaya, whose nationalistic program threatened U.S. financial and trade
interests, and who was forced to flea as a result of U.S. intervention-including military
intervention). A corporate secretary for a U.S. mining company was subsequently
installed as president, who then agreed to award to the U.S. a customs receivership and
control of Nicaraguan finances. Id. at 67.
88 See generally Max Holland, Private Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy, William
Pawley and the 1954 Coup d'ttat, in Guatemala, J. OF COLD WAR STUD., 36 (2005)
(describing covert and private forces at play in the U.S.-sponsored 1954 coup in
Guatemala in furtherance of U.S. private economic interests and Cold War politics).
89 See Joseph Collins, Tightening the Financial Knot, in THE END OF CHILEAN
DEMOCRACY: AN IDOC DOSSIER ON THE COUP AND ITS AF7ERMATH 178, 182 (Lawrence
Birns ed., 1974) (reviewing government documents that detail the pressure from U.S.
businesses and banks threatened by the Allende government's nationalization policies
and their support for U.S. intervention in Chile); LARS SCHOULZ, BENEATH THE UNITED
STATES: A HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 361 (1998) (noting that
"U.S. covert actions against Allende's Popular Unity government [has been] well-
documented").
90 BENJAMIN J. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST? INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 61 (1986) (describing bank loans as instrument of foreign
policy to effectuate Cold War strategies). But cf. Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., (forthcoming 2007) (commenting on official debt and noting
how countries that had the resources to do so provided loans and other financial
assistance to shore up "friendly governments").
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these states, invasions, occupations, and regime changes were
accomplished in part by a unity of interest in the United States
between financial agents and U.S. political actors. 91 Agreement as
to whether an odious regime was created or defeated by the pursuit
of these interests is unlikely, but the awareness of these
relationships must inform any approach to these issues. A theory
of Odious Debt must include more than the nature of the debt or
the parties bound to it; it must also address the geopolitical
interests that transcend any particular transaction.
These considerations further complicate the efforts to resolve
the problem of Odious Debt. Debt policies may serve as either
reward or punishment in foreign policy terms.92 How should
scholars, activists, or jurists factor in on this convergence of
power? Is the determination of odiousness of a regime affected by
American involvement in the support or creation of such regime?
Should the claim that financial transactions serve national interests
and are sanctioned at the highest level of political authority be a
consideration in the resolution of sovereign debt? Is the
evaluation of the odiousness of the debt affected by the creation
and management of the debt in part as a function of foreign
policy? The cases of the SDIC and the Machado loans illustrate
that whether through dollar or gunboat diplomacy, bankers and
politicians have resolved the issue of sovereign debt repayment in
a manner aptly described as functioning as "an alternative to
colonialism" to assure the realization of their mutual interests. 93
The relationship between profits and policy is not a condition
of the distant past, as illustrated in the following excerpt of a New
York Times article on Paul Volcker's transition as Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board to investment banking: "Asked whether he
felt prepared for the deal-making side of Wall Street, [Mr.
Volcker] said, referring to the negotiations on third-world debt that
took place while he was at the Fed, 'I don't know who you thought
was making all those deals; I was."' 9 Debt crises during the 1970s
91 COHEN, supra note 90, at 61.
92 See id. at 190.
93 ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 60.
94 Walker F. Todd, A Brief History of International Lending, from a Regional
Banker's Perspective, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 2 (1989) (quoting James Sterngold,
Volcker Gets Princeton Chair and Post at Investment Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1988, at
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and 1980s elicited a unified response from private financial
concerns and government, even when private banks were treated
preferentially as compared with official creditors. 9 Bankers exert
powerful influence on the government and benefit from lobbying,
channels of communication, networks, and a range of personal
connections where interests are peddled.96 Just as American
economic interests depended on the exercise of diplomatic and
military power during the twentieth century, so too have such
current interests operated at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. If, indeed, as many scholars note, 97 it is the post-Saddam
Iraq debt that has given new life to the Odious Debt debates, we
might do well to consider the role of U.S. private financial and
political interests in relationship to the Iraqi debt, dictatorship,
regime change, and debt forgiveness.
III. Legal Theories
The relationship between finance capital and geopolitical
interests is, of course, directly relevant to the consideration of the
very circumstances by which Odious Debts may be created. But it
is also an essential concern in determining the legal approach to
the resolution of debt enforcement. The considerations that
influence the making of loans must also inform legal strategies
adopted to regulate Odious Debt. If bankers are primary actors in
the shaping and implementation of foreign policy and government
intervenes in the development of market transactions, how then,
1, 26).
95 James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and its Origins in
Enforcement Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV 251, 257-59 (2006) (noting that
commercial banks and the U.S. government agreed on approaches to the issue of
sovereign debt repayment although commercial banks profited significantly compared
with government creditors).
96 COHEN, supra note 90, at 66 (describing the way in which bankers have powers
and channels of influence including congressional hearings, media, and public and
private meetings).
97 See Feibelman, supra note 62 (noting that the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime
"unleashed a wave of interest" in the topic of Odious Debt; see also Soren Ambrose,
Social Movements and The Politics Of Debt Cancellation, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 267, 278-79
(2005) (observing that the Odious Debt doctrine was recently revived with regard to
Iraq's debt); Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn From Each Other, 6
CHI. J. INT'L L. 391, 393-94 (2005) (noting that the doctrine of Odious Debt has
experienced a revival as a result of regime change in Iraq).
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does the law reflect this interlocking relationship in the resolution
of debt repayment disputes?
This Part reviews the way in which laws, regulations, legal
policy, and legal doctrine have been shaped by the convergence of
market and policy interests in ways that complicate the rationales
for legal approaches to Odious Debts. It questions the efficacy of
private law concepts applied in U.S. courts as a framework for a
workable legal theory. This part also reviews the trilogy of
decisions in Allied Bank International v. Banco Crdito Agricola
de Cartago (Allied 111)98 as another instance that demonstrates that
issues of national interests and foreign policy are at least as
relevant in determining outcomes in sovereign debt issues as are
principles of law.
A. Foreign Policy and Banking Laws
The regulation of financial institutions serves a number of
critical functions related to the soundness and stability of the
economy and the competitiveness of financial markets. Although
commentators have analyzed the nature of regulations that act to
limit lending to foreign borrowers for purposes of minimizing risk
exposure, the functions that such regulations may fulfill in regard
to implementing foreign policy strategies are often overlooked. 99
In this regard, several laws and regulations are worth examining to
illustrate the reciprocal relationship between private banking
interests and political power relevant to the development of an
Odious Debt doctrine.
1. The International Lending Supervision Act
As the 1980s debt crises in developing countries created
concerns about the absence of supervision of international lending
practices, Congress established oversight procedures to minimize
risks to the stability of banking systems. 00 During this period,
98 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985). See infra Part III B 2.
99 See generally Note, The Policies Behind Lending Limits: An Argument for a
Uniform Country Exposure Ceiling, 99 HARV. L. REv. 430 (1985) [hereinafter Policies
Behind Lending Limits]. A Westlaw search using the terms "foreign policy" and
"banking regulations" in the same sentence yielded only one journal article.
100 See Peter Dombrowski, Policy Responses to the Globalization of American
Banking, 108 (1996).
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foreign lending to less-developed countries (LDCs) increased
significantly, particularly by American commercial banks that
were less concerned with how foreign loans might be used than
were official lenders. °' Banks often preferred sovereign debtors
to private debtors because the former yielded higher profits and
offered enormous administrative fees for loans.
10 2
As a result of the increased activity in the foreign market,
Congress passed the International Lending Supervision Act of
1983 (ILSA) to assure that banks properly assessed the risks posed
by lending to foreign states and that they maintained adequate
reserves in the event of default.0 3  ILSA, however, did not
regulate the nature of foreign loans or the amount of lending
abroad. 104 And although the statute authorized agencies to rate
countries as a means to discourage lending to those states
considered "value-impaired," commentators have noted that the
administrative mechanisms for discouraging loans were based less
on measures of market indicators than on political judgments.105
Indeed, the act of declaring that a state lacked creditworthiness
could have been politically and economically destabilizing not just
to the debtor state and to banks themselves, which could not risk
the consequences of declaring the loans non-performing, but also
to the ability of the United States to maintain spheres of
101 See id. at 101 (noting that commercial banks were unconcerned with how loans
were used so long as debts were repaid). Private creditors continue to control a large
portion of sovereign debt. See Samuel E. Goldman, Mavericks in the Market: The
Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. INT'L. L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 159, 163 n.12 (2000) (noting, for example, that the Dart family of
Sarasota, Florida was Brazil's largest outside creditor). By the mid 1970s, almost half of
LDC loans were with private banks. Id. at 165-66.
102 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 101; see also COHEN, supra note 90, at 52-53
(noting that banks could generate substantial earnings from fees alone).
103 International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C. § 3901-3912 (2006);
Reporting and Disclosure of International Assets, 12 C.F.R §211.44 (2006), see also 12
C.F.R. 214 (governing agreements with foreign banks).
104 See Policies Behind Lending Limits, supra note 99, at 439 n.39; DOMBROWSKI,
supra note 100, at 102 (noting that banks were left to lend huge sums without any formal
requirement of analyzing the economic circumstances of the borrowing state).
105 Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1217 n.224 (1987) (noting political pressure
affecting the way in which the Interagency Country Evaluation Review Committee,
established by ILSA, handled foreign debt issues).
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influence. 106
In fact, the U.S. government relied on a strategy of making
uninterrupted private bank loans to foreign debtors not only as a
way of insuring that countries could continue debt repayments and
maintain the stability of the banking system, but to maintain its
political interests in borrowing countries and support those
governments deemed vital to U.S. interests.° 7 Without the flow of
debt dollars, the development and expansion of market economies
would have been limited. Just as importantly, it would have been
difficult to pursue Cold War policies designed to curry favor with
states that could have otherwise been drawn to the Soviet orbit.108
The amount and volume of loans increased with little effective
regulatory intervention despite the decreased ability of the LDCs
to repay debts.' 09
U.S. interests depended on sustained loans to developing
countries, notwithstanding the growing debt crisis and the threat of
sovereign state defaults. In this regard, ILSA might be described
as "soft law" with regard to its stated goals of assuring prudent and
responsible banking practices. ILSA provisions were inadequate
to regulate banking practices. GAO reports indicate that many
banks neither maintained proper scrutiny with regard to risky
lending practices nor maintained adequate loan reserves."0 But
more had to be done to facilitate loans, even when such
transactions may have been contrary to the good management and,
perhaps ultimately, the profitability of banks. Sound banking
106 Rory Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 327
n. 118 (2005) (noting that bank regulators were reluctant to identify credit-risk countries
because, among other issues, it would have created a threat to the U.S banking system);
Goldman, supra note 101, at 166-67; DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 113 (noting that
such exposure could have set off a "foreign policy crisis").
107 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 100 (noting that the U.S. relied on private bank
loans to avoid political instability in borrower states).
108 Id. at 105 (describing conflicts in the developing world that threatened U.S.
economic and security interests); COHEN, supra note 90, at 76 (quoting the staff of the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States "has important security
interests in other debtor countries . . . It can hardly afford to stand by and watch the
economies of these countries collapse, or to have their governments undermined
politically by financial difficulties").
109 Id. at 99-100.
110 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 123, 136.
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practices were considered secondary to instrumental banking
practices and the need to encourage loans to LDCs."' Indeed, the
banks that experienced the pressure of regulatory agencies were
those that were reluctant to extend financing to countries of
strategic importance to the United States."
12
2. Baker Plan and Brady Initiative
Two initiatives were designed to deal with the problem of
heavy LDC indebtedness where the current or imminent inability
to repay debts threatened domestic economic interests and U.S.
interests. The first, known as the Baker Plan, encouraged
commercial banks to maintain flows of funds to countries of
strategic importance to the United States." 3 The second, called the
Brady Initiative, encouraged loan forgiveness at the same time it
encouraged new loans. 114  Although neither initiative was
statutorily enacted, various federal regulatory schemes that
facilitated the plans actually functioned with the force of law." 5
Both plans required banks to increase loans to developing
countries, even when such loans might conflict with prudent
banking practices, and even when such loans would jeopardize the
111 COHEN, supra note 90, at 218-19 (describing pressures from Treasury and
Federal Reserve officials to continue loans to Latin American countries in default and
quoting Paul A. Volcker who directed that "new credits not be subject to supervisory
criticism").
112 Id. at 219.
113 See James A. Baker III, U.S. Sec'y of Treasury, Address Before the Joint Annual
Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, (Oct. 8, 1985), in 25
I.L.M. 412 [hereinafter Statement of James A. Baker].
114 Nicholas F. Brady, U.S. Sec'y of Treasury, Remarks Before the Third World
Debt Conference sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods
Committee (Mar. 10, 1989), in Dep't. of St. Bull., (May 1989), at 53-56 [hereinafter
Brady Initiative], available at http://www.findarticles.comlp/articles/mi_m1079/
isn2146_v89/ai_7654675. See Enrique R. Carrasco, The 1980s: The Debt Crisis and
the Lost Decade of Development, 9 TRANSNATL L. & CONTEMP. Probs. 119, 123 (1999);
Alex Voegelin, The Process of Rescheduling: Prospects After the Brady Initiative, 10
ANN. REV. OF BANKING L. 324, 325 (1991).
115 See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1060-61 (2004)
(describing the way in which federal regulators put pressure on commercial banks to
make new loans to sovereign debtors); Keith A. Palzer, Relational Contract Theory and
Sovereign Debt, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, 742 (1988) (noting the impact of the
federal regulatory system in sovereign loan transactions).
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economic stability of the borrowing countries." 6
a. The Baker Plan"'
The Baker Plan was an initiative set forth by the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker in October 1985 for the
purpose of managing the debt crisis." 8 The plan was designed to
encourage new loans by American commercial and multilateral
lenders to a number of highly indebted countries." 9  The loans
would be conditioned on the willingness of the borrowing country
to implement "'market-oriented' reform policies such as
deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of trade."' 2 °
Supporters of the plan touted it as a benefit to banking interests as
well as foreign policy interests. 121
The plan, considered by most commentators to be a failure,
increased the debts of sovereigns already burdened with debt
payments they could not make. 22 Nonetheless, Baker loans were
encouraged by Federal Reserve rules which accorded them
favorable treatment. 123  Tax regulations provided incentives for
Baker Plan loan transactions. 124  Banking regulations also eased
116 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 123-24 (observing that the drive to loan more
money to LDCs did not succeed in improving the state of their economies).
117 See Statement of James A: Baker, supra note 113.
118 Id.; see also Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: the Rise of the Secondary Market
and its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2714 n.66
(1996); Christine A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, World Debt: The United States Reconsiders,
64 FOREIGN AFF. 259, 267, 273 (1985).
119 Power, supra note 118, at 2714.
120 Santos, supra note 28, at 76; see also Bradley K. Boyd, The Development of a
Global Market-based Debt Strategy to Regulate Private Lending to Developing
Countries, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 461, 482 (1988) (noting requirements that the
sovereign debtor be willing to open its markets to foreign investment).
121 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 25 (stating that bank loans would help debtor
nations economically and would thus be more likely to pay their loans).
122 Macmillan, supra note 106, at 326-37.
123 Nancy Knupfer, Debt-for-Nature Swaps. Innovation or Intrusion? 4 N.Y. INT'L.
L. REV. 86, 87 n.32 (1991) (citing, for example, 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(2)(ii) which
liberalized the amount that banks are allowed banks to hold as equity in foreign
countries); see also Boyd, supra note 120, at 480 n.100 (noting revised Regulation K).
124 Allegra G. Biggs, Nibbling Away at the Debt Crisis: Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 10
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 429, 445-46 (1991) (describing a number of alternatives by
which LDCs debts might be considered to be paid down).
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the restrictions on U.S. bank ownership of foreign companies as
part of the Baker Plan transactions so long as the countries
involved agreed to liberalize the restrictions on foreign
investment. 25 As financial experts noted, these new bank rulings
promised to facilitate the expansion of banking interests in other
sectors such as manufacturing and service.'26
In sum, the Baker Plan allowed U.S. officials to exhort banks
to maintain, if not increase, their lending to heavily indebted
countries in turmoil. On-going lending was crucial to American
interests, particularly in Latin America where a backlash against
U.S. foreign and economic policies was taking shape. Banks were
encouraged to maintain their loans with Latin America for fear
that cash-poor countries would no longer be able to import goods
from the United States and would further result in price-cutting
measures by nations who urgently needed access to cash.2 7
However, greater incentives were necessary to obtain the volume
of loans demanded by the United States. The Brady Initiative was
designed to follow the Baker Plan and further induce banks to
intervene in the growing debt crisis.
b. Brady Initiative28
The Brady Initiative sought to foster market-based solutions to
the debt crises by encouraging private creditors to provide debt
relief through the conversion of loans into securities bonds and the
promotion of debt-equity schemes in addition to some debt
reduction or forgiveness. 129 Debt forgiveness in this form worked
125 Boyd, supra note 120, at 480 n.100; Mark H. Stumpf et al., International Debt:
Solutions to Insolvency or Illiquidity, 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 42, 46 (1986).
126 Boyd, supra note 120, at 480 (quoting industry experts in the Wall Street
Journal).
127 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 127.
128 See Brady Initiative, supra note 114.
129 See William M. Berenson, Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banking, 29
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 337, 343 (1995) (describing a debt-equity swap as "a
mechanism by which a bank exchanges foreign sovereign external debt of a debtor
country for an equity stake in a company in that country through privatization, stock
market investment, or direct investment"); Ross P. Buckley, Why Some Developing
Countries Are Better Placed Than the International Monetary Fund to Develop Policy
Responses to the Challenges of Global Capital, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 121, 132
(2006); Power, supra note 118, at 2720. These bonds were collateralized through IMF
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to the benefit of banks because countries would be more likely to
borrow again once cleared of old debts.13° As one commentator
noted, "[n]ew loans confirmed a country's creditworthiness and
this perception generated even more loans. 3' Indeed, following
the Brady Initiative, foreign capital poured into Latin America.'32
Congress encouraged implementation of the Brady Initiative
through a number of measures. 133  It extended support to the
prescriptions of the Brady Plan in the International Debt
Management Act, which directed federal banking regulatory
agencies to provide "'the widest possible latitude' with respect to
debt restructuring by commercial banks with high exposure to
third-world debt."'13 4 In addition, a series of administrative rulings
were enacted that served as inducements to banks.135 Revenue
rulings along with favorable tax regulations supported creative
means to facilitate and accomplish Brady goals. 136 The regulatory
function of the Securities and Exchange Commission also aided
banks who engaged in Brady-type transactions by issuing a ruling
and World Bank funds and assurances. See Macmillan, supra note 106, at 315.
130 Macmillan, supra note 106, at 314 n. 47.
131 COHEN, supra note 90, at 47 n.25 (quoting Banker's Trust official, Lawrence J.
Brainard).
132 Macmillan, supra note 106, at 314 n.47.
133 Mary Weiss, The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: An Instructive Modelfor
International Funding for the Environment, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 921, 935 (1992)
(noting that Congress required the Treasury to include collateral issues to debt
repayment, such as natural resource management initiatives in the Brady Plan).
134 Power, supra note 118, at 2720, n.102. (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5333,
specifically §5322(8), which urges "debtors and commercial bank creditors to recognize
that current approaches to the debt problem should focus on 'a reduction in current debt
service obligations' Douglas L. Hymas & Robert P. Doane, III, The International Debt
Management Act of 1988: Has the Baker Plan Been Replaced?, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV.
593, 604 (1989)).
135 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 153 (noting that accounting, tax, and other
regulatory changes were enacted to obtain cooperation from banks).
136 Roseanne Model, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Environmental Investments Using
Taxpayer Funds without Adequate Remedies for Expropriation, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1195, 1207, n.71, 72 (1991) (citing Revenue Rulings and Treasury Department
pronouncements encouraging debt for nature swaps, and a Washington Post story
quoting Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady who encouraged creative approaches to
implementing his plan to reduce foreign debt and make new loans at the same time). See
Biggs, supra note 124 at 445-46.
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to allow banks to avoid having to recognize a loss even when the
Brady bond values were less than a loan's value despite a pre-
existing general SEC interpretation to the contrary. 3 7 Although it
was unsuccessful in passing a bill, the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Banking and Financial Services
encouraged banks to participate in the Brady Plan and sought to
authorize favorable risk ratings to Brady-style loans.'38 Bank
regulators also facilitated the implementation of the Brady
Initiative through pressure on banks reluctant to engage in new
loan restructuring.'39
The Brady Initiative was considered one of the first efforts to
address the debt crises in a coherent and systematic manner. 40 It
was also considered more successful than the Baker Plan. ' 4' As
with the Baker Plan, however, it is difficult to assess the benefits
for LDCs. Debtor countries paid the price by having to sell off
state ownership in their industries and firms, and privatize without
regard to benefits or drawbacks of such economic restructuring.'42
The literature is filled with accounts of the difficulties caused by
structural adjustment programs and other conditionalities
associated to neoliberal reforms.143  There is no evidence that the
137 Buckley, supra note 129 at 134 n.78; Gathii, supra note 95, at 262.
138 Power, supra note 118, at 2720 n.104. This would have benefited banks by
allowing them to maintain a lower level of reserves. Id.
139 Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt
Trading from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT'L. L. J. 1802, 1809 (1998). See Goldman,
supra note 101, at 167 (noting that private debts were virtually required to restructure
their debts, although restructuring was technically voluntary).
140 Guillermo Emiliano Del Toro, Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico and the
1994 Crisis: A Legal Perspective, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 69-70 (1997) (describing the
plan as "homogenous and effective").
141 Richard Euliss, The Feasibility of the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism: An Alternative Statutory Approach to Mollify American Reservations, 19
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 107, 110-11 (2003) (noting the successful reduction in LDCs'
foreign debt).
142 Berenson, supra note 129, at 344 ("[s]elling off equities and privatization may be
seen as an excessive sell off of the national patrimony to foreign investors and cause
unwanted political problems for the debtor government").
143 John W. Head, For Richer Or For Poorer: Assessing The Criticisms Directed At
The Multilateral Development Banks, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 241 (2004) (noting the
criticism of international development banks that impose harmful conditions in exchange
for loans); Jason Morgan-Foster, The Relationship Of IMF Structural Adjustment
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Brady Initiative, while reaffirming debtor-creditor relations
between private banks and sovereign states, improved the well-
being of debtor nations.'"
3. Other Statutes Governing Market Transactions with
Foreign Governments.
The United States has long pursued geopolitical interests
through statutory control of commercial activity and its ability to
alter banking practices.'45 The Foreign Direct Investment Program
(FDIP) was enacted in 1968 after calls for voluntary restraints on
foreign direct investment failed to limit foreign direct
investments. 14 6 As noted above, Regulation K restricts bank debt-
for-equity investment to those countries that have restructured debt
and privatized according to externally imposed conditionalities.14"
The International Emergency Powers Act that allows the executive
Programs To Economic, Social, And Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case Revisited, 24
MICH. J. INT'L L. 577, 583 (2003) (noting the findings of a study indicating that structural
adjustment conditions lead to poor economic results); Peter Uvin, 'Do As I Say, Not as I
Do': The Limits of Political Conditionality 5 EURO. J. OF DEVEL. RESEARCH 63, 74-74
(1993) (noting the lack of effective if not disastrous results produced by economic and
political conditionalities attached to development funds); Saliwe M. Kawewe & Robert
Dime, The Impact of Economic Structural Adjustment Programs [ESAPs] on Women
and Children: Implications for Social Welfare in Zimbabwe, 27 J. OF Soc. AND SOC.
WELFARE 79, 79 (2000) (arguing that structural adjustment programs introduced by
international financial institutions have been inappropriate for Zimbabwe); Fran Ansley,
Inclusive Boundaries And Other (Im)Possible Paths Toward Community Development In
A Global World 150 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 380-81 n. 50 (2001) (observing that structural
adjustment policies have constrained national policies and have created additional debt
burdens on poorer countries).
144 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 163; Santos, supra note 28, at 70.
145 DOMBROWSKI, supra note 100, at 37 (noting the efforts of the U.S. government,
acting as principal, to influence and alter the course of banking practices).
146 Exec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1968), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. app. § 95a
(1976). This Executive Order was issued under authority granted to the President by the
1917 Trading With the Enemy Act, Ch. codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)
(1976). See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital
Markets Perspective 102 YALE L.J. 387, 417 n.123 (1992); see also DOMBROWSKI, supra
note 100, at 16 (noting that the efforts to reduce foreign credit were part of a plan to
align banking practices with foreign policy interests).
147 Manuel Monteagudo, The Debt Problem: The Baker Plan and the Brady
Initiative: A Latin American Perspective, 8 INT'L. LAW. 59, 70 n.57 and accompanying
text (1994); Thomas M. Reiter, The Feasibility of Debt-Equity Swaps in Russia, 15
MICH. J. INT'L L. 909, 915 n.27 (1994).
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branch to regulate foreign loans when, for example, foreign policy
or economic issues warranted has also been broadly interpreted in
order to gain leverage against other debtor countries. 
148
Statutory prohibitions on commercial transactions with
sovereigns perceived to be hostile to U.S. interests, even when
outside the scope of banking matters, further illustrate the
convergence of financial and political interests and are worth
briefly mentioning. For example, embargos on trade with Cuba,
including the Hickenlooper Amendment (1976), 149 the Torricelli
Act (1992),150 and the Helms-Burton Act (1996),"l were
promulgated due to the Cuban government's expropriation of
American assets through nationalization and its refusal to allow
American firms opportunities to extract profits from Cuba. More
generally, the Trading with the Enemy Act (1917) and other
economic sanction statutes impose a range of economic and trade
restrictions for foreign policy purposes. 5 2 Similarly, the Foreign
Assistance Act (1961) establishes political conditions for any
economic aid to foreign countries.153 The International Trade
Administration of the Department of Commerce, authorized by the
United States and Foreign Commercial Service Act (1980),
mandates the Secretary of Commerce to regulate U.S. business
activities in conformity with foreign policy interests.'54
148 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). See Mariano-Florentino
Cudllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 244 (2006)
(observing the ease with which the government has been able to declare emergency
conditions in order to exercise economic constraints under the statute).
149 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
150 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified as
22 U.S.C.§§ 6001-6010 (2004)).
151 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091, 6061-6067 (2004)).
152 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917)
(codified as amended in 50 App. U.S.C. §§1-44) See Wendy N. Duong, Partnerships
with Monarchs in the Development of Energy Resources - Case Two: Dissecting an
Independent Power Project and Re-evaluating the Role of Multilateral and Project
Financing in the International Energy Sector, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, 138 n. 460
(2005) (providing a list of various statutes prohibiting trade with Iran, Burma, Sudan,
and Libya).
153 Scott Meisler, Into The Impetuous Vortex. The Mansfield Amendment, Political
Accountability, and the Separation of Powers, 93 GEO. L.J. 2097, 2108 (2005).
154 15 U.S.C. § 4721 (2000).
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The 1949 Export Control Act'55 and its successor, the Export
Administration Act, 116 were used as instruments of the Cold War
to weaken the Soviet Union.157 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(1977) also placed restrictions on U.S. companies with regard to
foreign transactions.'58 Federal law made it a crime for any entity
to lend to a sovereign that is in default in the payment of a debt to
the United States. 5 9 The Taiwan Relations Act (1979) promoted
free markets and commercial exchanges between the United States
and Taiwan in function of a foreign policy designed to obstruct the
reunification of Taiwan and China.16
0
These statutes demonstrate that government interests at times
appear to overshadow and limit, if not conflict with, market
transactions.' 61 However, it is often not difficult to identify how
market interests converge with trade and other market restriction
statutes. The U.S. government encouraged banks to make loans
even when growing debts of developing countries threatened their
stability.162 At the same time, banks were motivated to make loans
because they believed there were significant profits to be made. 163
In the case of the Hickenlooper Amendment, which banned trade
with Cuba and other sovereigns that expropriate U.S. property, the
155 50 U.S.C. App § 5(b) (2000).
156 50 U.S.C. App §§ 2402-20 (continued by Exec. Order No. 13,222, 60 Fed. Reg.
44,025 (Aug. 17, 2001).
157 See Andreas L. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends. Four
Perspectives, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 355, 358 (2003) (describing the Act as the principal
means by which to sanction the Soviet Union); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Reassessing the
Hickenlooper Amendment, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 115, 139 (1988) (noting that a poll of the
members of the Council of the Americas taken in August 1970 revealed that of the
membership that owned ninety percent of U.S. investment in Latin America, seventy-six
percent believed the Hickenlooper Amendment, which prohibited trade with Cuba, was
harmful to their interests).
158 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (3), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
159 18 U.S.C. § 955 (2000).
160 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2000). See Terry E. Chang, The Gold Rush in the East.
Recent Developments in Foreign Participation Within China's Securities Markets as
Compared to the Taiwanese Mode, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279, 312 (2005).
161 Lowenfeld, supra note 157, at 369 (observing that "[e]conomic sanctions for
political ends are the opposite of mercantilism").
162 COHEN, supra note 90, at 40.
163 Id.
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statute was strongly supported by private economic interests.'64
On the other hand, when the legal force of statutes such as the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act do not favor this convergence,
enforcement of the law may still be an unlikely scenario. 165 The
foreign availability provision of the Export Control Act is also
instructive here. The Act limits the imposition of controls for
foreign policy or national security interests if the controlled goods
or services are available "in sufficient quantities and comparable
in quality to those produced in the United States so as to render the
controls ineffective in achieving their purposes."' 166 Thus, national
security interests may be tempered by the competitive interests of
American business.
These statutes set in relief the difficulties attending efforts to
develop strategies to resolve sovereign debt disputes. They
suggest that the market rarely acts outside of the scope of national
interests, and vice versa. Foreign banking is politicized and
foreign policy is commercialized. The realpolitik of lending
activity requires a debt resolution framework that addresses not
only the circumstances of the sovereign debtor or the practices of
creditor banks, but the circumstances of U.S. interests in which all
such transactions are conceived and conducted.
B. Private Law Tools, Litigation, and the Resolution of
Odious Debt
Writers have identified a broad range of issues which a legal
doctrine of Odious Debt ought to address. Scholars have proposed
to enumerate the elements by which a regime may be declared
odious and they have offered ideas as to those institutions they
164 See Vandevelde, supra note 157, at 156 (observing that the statute was in
furtherance of private goals, strongly lobbied by such interests, and in opposition to
foreign policy interests).
165 See Dimitri K. Simes, President, Nixon Center, & Paul J. Saunders, Director,
Nixon Center, Tuesday, Testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, United States House of Representatives, September 21, 1999, available at
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/testimony/9-21_99Russia.htm.
166 50 App. U.S.C. § 2403(C) (2000) (but allowing for the President to nonetheless
impose restrictions if "adequate evidence has been presented to him demonstrating that
the absence of such controls would prove detrimental to the foreign policy or national
security of the United States").
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believe to be best suited for the task.'67 Some have suggested a
debt-by-debt approach to determine whether certain transactions
can be deemed odious. 68  Others have suggested the use of
bankruptcy to resolve the problem. 169 Some commentators have
sought to sort out the most appropriate adjudicatory bodies for
hearing claims of Odious Debt. 7° Much of the discourse is framed
around the question of whether Odious Debt is a matter best
resolved within the realm of public law or whether private law
addresses the issues more effectively. 7'
This section challenges the proposition that private law in U.S.
domestic courts holds promise for the establishment of a workable
legal theory to address Odious Debt. First, it questions the
appropriateness of the application of laws that govern private
relationships to public matters. Odious Debt, as demonstrated in
this article, implies regime changes, coups, occupation, state
succession, and the instrumental use of financial transactions for
hegemonic purposes-all facets of empire-building and global
hegemonic shifts.7 2  As a normative concern, these are matters
167 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 5, at 2-3 (defining such a regime as one that engages
in systematic suppression or systematic looting and suggesting that the UN Security
Council make the determination as to which regime is odious); see also Khalfan et al.,
supra note 61, at 42; Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 81, at 30 (describing various
institutions as options for operationalizing the definitions of Odious Debt).
168 Buchheit, et al., supra note 3, at 21 (noting that the Sack definition of Odious
Debt called for a debt-by-debt approach, that is, if a loan is used to benefit the people, it
is repayable regardless of the nature of the regime, but if it is used for ill purposes or
benefits only the ruler, it is odious and can be repudiated).
169 Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Doctrine of Odious Debts: the
Missing Link in the International Human Rights Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2007) (discussing a bankruptcy mechanism); see also Power, supra note
118, at 2767.
170 Tom Ginsburg & Thomas S. Ulen, Odious Debt, Odious Credit, Economic
Development, and Democratization 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007)
(examining proposals to establish international committees or international tribunals to
determine Odious Debt).
171 See Buchheit et al., supra note 3, at 29; Feibelman, supra note 62, at 727; Anna
Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn From Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391,
394 (2005) (noting the increase in the use of private law tools such as contracts between
sovereign debtors and creditors).
172 Larry Catd Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba and
the IMF, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 497, 534 (2006) (quoting Fidel Castro querying
whether it is possible "to separate the private concerns from issues requiring direction
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better suited for the application of public international law than
private law concepts. Second, this section reviews case law
development in the area of sovereign debt disputes to demonstrate
that the outcome of such cases is likely to be a function of foreign
policy concerns that eclipse other legal considerations. As a
result, efforts to litigate Odious Debt will always be idiosyncratic
and situational.
1. Private Law and Public Turmoil
Private law has become a dominant tool in the efforts to
resolve legal disputes arising out of globalized market
transactions. 17  Such is the case with sovereign debt matters.
Private law has assumed a dominant role in the scheme of
sovereign debt repayment generally, notwithstanding the fact that
nation-states have long been considered as subjects of public
law.174 Predictability, stability, order, and harmonization, all
properties associated with private law, are important factors in
banking transactions and contract enforcement, and hence explain
the appeal of private law arguments in fashioning an Odious Debt
doctrine to private economic actors. 75
The characteristic for which private law is credited, if not
appreciated, is its perceived indifference to the political.
Proponents argue that private law provides the basis for "utterly
nonpolitical arguments" and "change[s] the nature of any dispute
from hotly ideological to seemingly neutral and objective." '176
and control by the political community").
173 Caruso, supra note 12, at 3 (2006) (noting that private law has helped to
establish "new centers of authority" in the global arena); A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE
POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 16, 180 (2003) (noting the increasing influence of private power in
the global political economy). Cutler notes that even when private international law
previously was used to determine controversies, national law as opposed to private law
was the focus. Id. at 18. For a review of the debates about the dominance of European
private law, see Ugo Mattei & Fernanda Nicola, A "Social Dimension" in European
Private Law? The Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2006).
174 CUTLER, supra note 173, at 24 (describing states as subjects of international
law). See Buchheit et al., supra note 3, at 55 (noting that matters of sovereign debt were
historically determined on the basis of diplomatic intervention).
175 Caruso, supra note 12, at 73-74.
176 Id. at 19 (reviewing the arguments in favor of private law as a tool of creating
public structures). CUTLER, supra note 173, at 62 (noting how merchant law as a form of
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Private law concepts, it is suggested, offer the all-important
quality of impartiality.'77 The apparent disregard for redistributive
concerns and for distance from government regulation have been
celebrated as properties likely to enhance private ordering of
contractual rights and obligations. 7 8  Debts falling within this
category of concerns may be well-suited by private law formulas.
As one scholar has noted, with other issues implicated in the
Odious Debt discourse, debating the proper place of private law
may "serve as proxy for a much more basic battle over much
larger stakes."'179 If we consider the human rights concerns that
distinguish Odious Debt from other debt, we must decide whether
the roles and functions of private law are consistent with the tasks
at hand. Even private law principles such as illegality,
unconscionability, duress, unclean hands, unjust enrichment, and
other equitable claims and defenses are limited to the dealings of
the parties to the transaction. The purpose of private law is to do
justice between the parties to the dispute without influencing
outside relationships. 180  When put to the purpose of resolving
international disputes, private law purportedly does not determine
or interfere with systemic changes. 18' According to these claims,
private law is not suited to function as a set of normative rules
with general applicability to discourage governments or lenders
from entering into debts that may have morally repugnant
consequences for the citizens of the debtor state. Private law
functions thus limit what can and should be accomplished in
regard to Odious Debt.
There is a paradox to be noted, however, which further
confirms that private law is not suitable as a framework for a legal
private law was understood as "apolitical and neutral in operation and in effect").
177 Caruso, supra note 12, at 34.
178 Id. at 22-23.
179 Backer, supra note 172, at 499.
180 Christoph U. Schmid, Pattern of Legislative and Adjudicative Integration of
Private Law, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 415, 484 (2002) (noting that the purpose of private law
is to obtain fairness and justice between the parties to the dispute without influencing
circumstances or outside relationships). But see Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law
and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 471, 474
(2005) (arguing that private international law may regulate social relations).
181 Wai, supra note 180, at 473 (noting that private international law deals with the
disputes of parties not the dispute of systems).
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theory to resolve Odious Debts. Private law, notwithstanding its
designation as apolitical, often serves political interests as much as
it responds to the logic of the market. Its political dimensions are
of the order of the market, not the order of human rights.
Although its bias may be "rendered invisible by an ideology that
defines the private sphere in apolitical terms," private law often
"functions ideologically and normatively to support the value and
superiority of economic liberalism."' 82
Historian Emily Rosenberg has demonstrated the way in which
loans negotiated as private contracts between sovereign debtors
and private creditors functioned in aid of U.S. capital interests.
83
She notes that the rhetoric of contract law, particularly in
relationship to sovereign debtors and private creditors, may
conceal relationships of power under the guise of contract
principles such as mutuality.'84 Indeed, it was through the private
contract provisions, with its emphasis on private law enforcement
mechanisms, that the United States often exercised dollar
diplomacy as marketplace transactions and thus gained control of
developing countries, particularly in Latin America, for its own
political and economic interests.'85
In fact, Odious Debts cannot be treated as a nonpolitical
matter. Such debts are not the exclusive business of private
international actors. Consideration of Odious Debts requires a
workable legal theory that acknowledges public international law,
the normative character of which is more suited to systemic
transformations and human rights concerns as opposed to private
law "that empties or neutralizes the law of the land."' 8 6 Private
182 CUTLER, supra note 173, at 62, 69, 242. Mattei & Nicola, supra note 173, at 44,
48 (observing that private law serves to facilitate accumulation and exploitation and
global capitalism); Richard Delgado, About Your Masthead: A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Compatibility of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 9
(2004) (stating that private law is premised in principles of the marketplace and
capitalism); CUTLER, supra note 173, at 34 (quoting Joel Paul; private law is not about
public power).
183 ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 76 (describing the preference for private contracts
as a means of regulating foreign economies, particularly so that no congressional
approval would be required).
184 Id. at 72.
185 Id. at 71-72.
186 CUTLER, supra note 173, at 24 (quoting Boaventura de Sosa Santos).
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law, its proponents admit, provides no readily useful solution to
Odious Debt.
2. Litigating Odious Debts in U.S. Courts
In addition to considering proposals as to the type of law that
should apply to Odious Debt disputes, there is also the matter of
the location where such disputes might be resolved. Some
scholars have proposed the courts of the United States.187 There is
no existing body of case law vis-A-vis Odious Debt that illustrates
how such a doctrine would fare if these issues were to be litigated
in the domestic courts of the United States.'88 There are, however,
a number of cases related to sovereign debt repayment, and a
review of these decisions offers some insight into the possible
outcomes. We focus on Allied Bank International v. Banco
Crdito Agricola de Cartago,'89 a case that has been the subject of
scholarly analysis elsewhere, particularly with regard to the act of
state doctrine which "operates to confer presumptive validity on
certain acts of foreign sovereigns by rendering non-justiciable
claims that challenge such acts."' 9 °
Allied is instructive for a number of reasons. The case was
initially brought in 1982 by a syndicate of creditor banks after
Costa Rica suspended payments on its external debts in response
to a growing economic crisis (Allied I).19 Costa Rica was the first
country in Latin America to cease payments on external debts. 192
Costa Rica filed a motion to dismiss the action on grounds
including sovereign immunity and the banks subsequently filed for
summary judgment.'93 Costa Rica responded by raising the act of
state doctrine. 194  In July 1983, the district court denied both
187 Buchheit et al., supra note 3, at 29, 56.
188 Id. at 29 (suggesting courts of the state of New York as an appropriate forum).
189 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
190 Id. at 520. For a discussion on the act of state doctrine, see Gathii, supra note
95, at 286-305; see also Fisch & Gentile, supra note 115, at 1079-81.
191 Allied Bank International v. Banco Crdito Agrfcola de Cartago (Allied 1), 566
F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Allied 111, 757 F.2d at 519.
192 Marc Edelman, Back From the Brink, NACLA Rep. on the Am. Nov.-Dec. 1985
at 37, 39.
193 Allied 111, 757 F.2d at 519.
194 Id.
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motions, and noted a judgment in favor of Allied in this case
would put the judicial branch of the United States at odds with
policies of central importance as articulated by a foreign
government and was not deemed to be in the interest of the U.S.
government who might suffer in relations to Costa Rica.'95
Thereafter, an agreement was reached between thirty-eight of the
thirty-nine creditor banks; Costa Rica refinanced its debts,
payments resumed, and the case was dismissed.'96 The one hold-
out creditor, however, appealed, (Allied I) and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit heard the matter. 197
In Allied II, argued and decided in the Spring of 1984, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, while affirming the
district court, did so under principles of comity, and did not
determine the applicability of the act of state doctrine.' 98 Instead,
the court held that Costa Rica's actions in cancelling repayment of
debt were consistent with the law and policy of the United States
and that both the U.S. legislative and executive branches were
fully supportive of Costa Rica's actions.' 99 The court delved into
the views of the U.S. government with some particularity, and
excerpted passages from legislative hearings held around the time
Costa Rica had issued its decrees prohibiting payment through late
1983:
President Reagan and the Congress reacted sympathetically to
Costa Rica's financial crisis and its default on Foreign
Assistance Act loans. The President advised that [continuation
of] U.S. assistance to Costa Rica is consistent with the
commitment of this Administration and in Congress to help
Costa Rica regain economic viability. We therefore regard such
assistance, which is designed to help the Government with
financial and management reforms and with needed credit to the
private sector, as vital and in the national interest. We are
195 The court noted that a decision enforcing the debt could damage the relationship
between the executive branch of the United States and the government of Costa Rica.
Allied 1, 566 F. Supp. at 1444.
196 Allied I11, 757 F. 2d at 519.
197 Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Cr6dito Agrfcola de Cartago (Allied I1), U.S. App.
LEXIS 23237 (1984).
198 Id.
199 Id.; Allied 111, 757 F. 2d at 519.
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hopeful that bilateral debt restructuring will be completed within
the next several months.2 °0
The court noted additional evidence of the government's opinion
on this issue, citing the Congressional resolution and history: the
House of Representatives also expressed "full support for the
Republic of Costa Rica and its democratic institutions as that
country responds to the current economic crisis" (citations
omitted). 20 ' And finally, the court noted,
In January 1983, the United States joined several other nations
in the signing of the Paris Club Agreed Minute which
rescheduled the intergovernmental debt of Costa Rica. The
Agreed Minute contained a provision recommending the
rescheduling of Costa Rica's commercial obligations.
202
On this last point, the court cited the brief in support of Costa Rica
as its source.20 3
For the first time, in June 1984, the United States lent its
support to the creditor banks that had requested rehearing.24 In
Allied III, the United States appeared as amicus curiae and
enunciated a different position than two federal courts had
previously interpreted.2 5 The U.S. government sought to explain
its apparent inconsistencies with its earlier statements upon which
the court had relied.20 6 It claimed that while it supported the
principles of negotiated debt payment, it opposed Costa Rica's
unilateral effort at restructuring as inconsistent with U.S. policy.
207
On the basis of this new elucidation of the government's position,
the court reversed its previous decisions.20 8
The court subsequently analyzed the act of state doctrine as the
next step in determining whether the Costa Rican decrees




204 S. Karene Witcher, U.S. Backs Banks Against Costa Rica in Loan Squabble,
WALL ST. J., June 12, 1984, at 1.
205 Allied 111, 757 F.2d at 519.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 520.
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repudiating debt were subject to judicial review by U.S. courts.0 9
The court explained that the act of state doctrine was primarily
concerned with foreign policy prerogatives within the province of
the legislative and executive branches, and required a
determination as to whether judicial consideration of Costa Rica's
acts would prejudice U.S.-Costa Rica relations. 2'0  Notably, the
court made reference to the Supreme Court's judicial preference to
"avoid the creation of 'an inflexible and all-encompassing rule' to
govern the applicability of the doctrine., 21 As we argue in this
article, however, such flexibility also allows strategic interests to
prevail over principles and thwart the goals of those who seek to
develop a workable legal theory to resolve Odious Debt.21 2
The court ultimately avoided a determination of the application
of the act of state doctrine to Costa Rica's decrees. It held that the
situs of the debt was the United States and not Costa Rica, and
thus, the act of state doctrine did not apply. 213 Its final assessment,
however, turned on the U.S. position that Costa Rica's unilateral
effort to repudiate private debt was inconsistent with U.S. policy
on debt obligation and contrary to U.S. interests.214
The case of Costa Rica invites a closer examination of the
context within which the Allied claim was decided. Each decision
turned on the position of the United States. It must be asked: Is it
plausible to conclude that the government of the United States
would not have made its position known in Allied I? Should we
accept that the United States revealed to neither party nor the
courts its position on Costa Rica's obligations when the case was
first appealed in Allied II, particularly given that Costa Rica in its
brief claimed to articulate the U.S. government's position? The
district court dismissed Allied's claim explicitly on its
understanding of the government's position. Would the United
209 Id.
210 Id. at 520-21.
211 Allied 111, 757 F. 2d at 521.
212 See Gathii, supra note 95, at 304-05 (suggesting that Allied H contravenes the
proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches by granting to
the executive essentially unreviewable powers to determine sovereign debt
controversies).
213 Allied II1, 757 F. 2d at 521.
214 Id. at 522.
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States not have been concerned about expressing its policy on such
a critical case as sovereign debt knowing that court decisions
would be premised on its very views of the matter?
The U.S. government remained silent when the case first came
before the court of appeals. What changed? One might argue that
Costa Rica's actions changed, but only to renegotiate and to
recommence payment to the satisfaction of thirty-eight of the
thirty-nine creditors, actions that were consistent with the
articulated position of the United States in Allied III. Costa Rica's
unilateral determination to repudiate debt, the basis upon which
the United States explained its position in Allied III may have been
the state of facts in Allied I and Allied II, and may have been the
state of facts when the decision was made to continue U.S. aid and
when U.S. support was expressed for Costa Rica's efforts to solve
its economic crisis. Costa Rica, however, was not engaged in
unilateral actions (if ever they were) when Allied III was decided.
Omitted from the discussions of the Allied decisions are other
important dimensions of U.S.-Costa Rica relations. The reversal
of the U.S. government is perplexing. Clearly something
happened between October 1983 (Allied I1) and June 1984 (Allied
III) to cause the Reagan administration to reverse itself-
awkwardly and unexpectedly-on the matter of the Costa Rican
debt. The circumstances surrounding this change serve to
underscore the anomalous character of the Odious Debt discourse.
The explanation may have to do with the changing strategic
interests of the United States. During the early 1980s, U.S. covert
operations against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua were in
the process of expanding and in need of larger regional legitimacy,
for which Washington demanded support from Costa Rican
President Luis Alberto Monge. Indeed, keeping Costa Rica
financially sound and "as a counterweight to Nicaragua" was a key
U.S. strategic interest.215 However, in November 1983, only one
month after Allied II, President Monge proclaimed Costa Rican
neutrality and refused to cooperate with U.S. intervention efforts
against the Sandinista government.216
In the months that followed, the United States increased its
215 Edelman, supra note 192, at 45.
216 Costa Rica Proclaims Neutrality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1983, at A12 ("The
neutrality of Costa Rica will be active," proclaimed President Monge).
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pressure on the Monge government. Washington extended
support to anti-Monge factions inside Costa Rica. The United
States, only one month before intervening in Allied III as amicus,
was seeking to exploit the "deepening existing conflicts within the
Government of President Luis Alberto Monge, who is firmly
committed to the nation's neutrality, and strengthen the hand of
his opponents in the country who are more supportive of
Washington's position.' 21 7 At the same time, U.S. Ambassador
Curtin Winsor was reported to have threatened the Costa Rican
government with a denial of foreign aid. 1 g  Subsequently,
documents produced during the trial of Oliver North detailed the
economic blackmail waged by the United States against Costa
Rica in an effort to enlist its support for the "Nicaraguan
resistance. 2 1 9 It is in this context that the reversal of the Reagan
administration against the Costa Rican government becomes
intelligible, and in the process raises corollary issues of the degree
to which matters of debt, and the impartiality of U.S. courts, can
credibly be separated from the political interests of the United
States.
U.S. strategic interests do not tell the entire story of Costa
Rica's sovereign debt. In the early 1980s, Costa Rica was targeted
to receive large amounts of U.S. funds tied to structural
adjustments and policy changes emphasizing privatization. 220 U.S.
officials insisted that Costa Rica privatize its banks, and much of
U.S. aid was targeted for this purpose.22' Indeed, the United States
was keen on reforming Costa Rica's social welfare state and
reshaping it to conform to the policies and programs of
neoliberalism to the benefit of U.S. economic interests.222 U.S. aid
217 Richard J. Meislin, U.S. Aid to Seek Costa Rica Shift, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1984,
at D22.
218 Id.
219 MARTHA HONEY, HOSTILE ACTS: U.S. POLICY IN COSTA RICA IN THE 1980s 63
(1994).
220 Id. at 51, 53; Edelman, supra note 192, at 40-42 (noting an influx of U.S. aid tied
to structural reforms and privatization).
221 HONEY, supra note 219, at 79-80 (describing less than transparent maneuvers
orchestrated by US AID to force Costa Rica to denationalize its banks).
222 Id. at 77-86. The U.S. also exerted influence on Costa Rica to reform its
agricultural export policies in ways that tied it to the U.S. market. Id. at 168.
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and loans required shifts in agricultural policies that benefitted
foreign-owned agribusinesses while small Costa Rican businesses
were losing their footing.223 As a result of these policy shifts,
foreign debt soared.224 For those concerned with Odious Debt, an
additional concern to be examined is the extent to which U.S.
interests and influence in Costa Rica contributed to its sovereign
debt difficulties.
Allied is but one sovereign debt case whose outcome is tied to
the expressed interests of the U.S. government. There may be
little else at issue in these matters as the courts have not been
susceptible to defenses that might otherwise be available to
sovereign debtors.22 Sovereign debt cases that follow the Allied
decisions have corresponded to shifting U.S. interests.226 Some
may defend this process as duly deferential to the "institutional
competence and... the distinctive position of the President in the
domain of foreign affairs." '227 But this hardly leads to a workable
legal theory for resolving Odious Debts and defeats any likelihood
223 Id. at 138.
224 Id. at 139 (noting that the nontraditional agricultural export entities, dominated
by foreign capital, were given duty and tax breaks).
225 Gathii, supra note 95, at 308-09.
226 See Hal S. Scott, Sovereign Debt Default: Cry for the United States, Not
Argentina, 21-31, (Wash. Legal Found., Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper No. 140,
2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfsfWashingtonlegal
2006.pdf. In 1995, the Clinton Administration, appeared as amicus in a case involving
Brazil's sovereign debt brief but this time supported the defaulting Brazil. CIBC Bank
and Trust Co. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y 1995). Ten years
later, the court of appeals determined a sovereign debt case in favor of Brazil without
U.S. intervention, but upon the basis that the decision was consistent with U.S. policy.
Pravin Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
Beginning in 2001, the United States again intervened on behalf of Argentina in a series
of cases for reasons, as some speculate, to discourage Argentina's move away from neo
liberal policies and the market. Scott, supra note 226, at 37. Most recently, the U.S.
government filed as amicus on behalf of Argentina in support of Argentina's efforts to
resist restraining notices and orders of attachment imposed on an Argentine bank account
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the ground that those assets were protected
from attachment by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. The court of appeals
upheld the district court's decision and vacated such orders. EM Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, 473 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2007).
227 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 4
(Univ. of Chicago, Pub. Law Working Paper no. 128, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=901999.
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of achieving stability, predictability, or a common set of standards
by which relief may be granted for citizens plagued with the
burdens of these transactions.
IV. Conclusion
The examination of these relationships as a matter of the
historical record serves to set in relief the complex-and indeed the
inexorable-interaction between national interests and finance
capital under optimum circumstances. We suggest these to be
optimum conditions in the sense that the passage of time has
afforded the researcher the opportunity to access private personal
papers, corporate records, and government classified documents.
In sum, these are materials that were previously closed but are
vital to a fuller understanding of the workings of financial interests
and political power in the real world. This array of research
materials provides a rich source of information that is unavailable
for the study of recent developments. It is thus to the past that we
turn in search of insight into the real workings of Odious Regimes
and Odious Debt as a means to advance some tentative approaches
to similar concerns in the present.
It is as a result of the insights gained from the past that we
suggest that the development of a legal theory relative to Odious
Debt must perforce address the complex web of interests
implicated in transactions between private creditors, sovereign
debtors, and national interests. In fact, we believe that the
development of a usable legal theory to address Odious Debt is a
highly problematic proposition. As a normative matter, we think
that private legal tools are poorly disposed to accomplish these
goals.228 The mere invocation by the U.S. government of matters
228 Of the proposals that have been offered, we come closest to agreeing with the
general recommendations that international institutions would best be suited to make
determinations about Odious Debt. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to
Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of International
Institutions, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 529, 529 (2000) (noting that "[i]nstitutions represent the
concrete manifestations of the normative aspirations of law in the international system").
For example, Bolton and Skeel suggest the U.N. Security Council, whereas we would
hesitatingly propose the U.N. General Assembly or other U.N. oversight body. Bolton &
Skeel, supra note 5, at 3. Bolton and Skeel also suggest the IMF as a suitable institution
to assess the nature and character of the debt transaction. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 5,
at 9. On this point, we refer to the need for and proposals to restructure and reform the
IMG with regard to governance issues as scholars in the field have urged. Daniel B.
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of "national security," for example, is often sufficient to affect the
outcome, if not suspend judicial proceedings wherein such
concerns are raised.229
We would thus prefer to think more about addressing the
conditions that create Odious Debt in the first place. If indeed, as
we suggest, there is little likelihood for the development of a
usable Odious Debt legal theory, and notwithstanding the appeal
of the intellectual challenge of the academic exercise that such an
undertaking implies, it would be perhaps more fruitful to reflect on
some of the larger implications of the real world context of the
Odious Debt discourse if only to understand the nature of the
international system, from which perhaps other kinds of useful
knowledge may be obtained.
Most importantly, however, we think that lenders, whether
official or private, ought to take a page from domestic lenders such
as Self Help Credit Union 3° based in North Carolina, or Acci6n
USA based in Boston.2 1' Their principles of lending strengthen
businesses and the communities where they operate, and who have
identified comparative principles of Odious Debt in the form of
predatory lending issues, and whose practices may provide the
standards for creating wealth and creating markets, accomplished
without exploitation or harm. As Robert Kuttner stated,
[t]he nations of the developing world are not just 'emerging
markets,' as the phrase has it. They are human societies. It
is high time to make markets our servant, not our master.
We need to appreciate the power of the engine, but
recognize that it needs to be steered; and to respect that
human ingenuity and social consensus take as many diverse
forms as there are diverse cultures. Commerce may be
Bradlow, The Governance of the IMF: The Need for Comprehensive Reform, Meeting of
the G24 Technical Committee (2006), available at http://www.g24.org/brad0906.pdf;
Abbas Mirakhor & Iqbal Zaidi, Rethinking the Governance of the International
Monetary Fund, (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 273, 2006), available at
http:l/www.imf.orgexternal/pubs/ftwp/2006/wpO6273.pdf.
229 Michael J. O'Connell, A Turn for the Worse: Foreign Relations, Corporate
Human Rights Abuse, And the Courts, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 234-41 (2004)
(reviewing cases where the courts have invited the State Department to comment on
whether human rights-related law suits would interfere with U.S. foreign policy).
230 Self Help Credit Union, http://www.self-help.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2007)
231 Acci6n USA, available at http://www.accionusa.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2007)
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global, but the paths to human development are
substantially local. We have not reached the end of history,
and those who think so should read some history with more
humility.
23 2
232 Robert Kuttner, Development, Globalization, and Law, 29 MICH J. INT'L L. 10,
38 (2004).
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